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| Title |
Essays on the economics of information / Matthew Robertson. |
| Name |
Robertson, Matthew. . |
| Abstract |
In three distinct, yet interrelated, essays I examine the effects of asymmetric information and imperfect information on economic decision makers' incentives and behaviour. To do so I employ, and modify, the methodology of Bayesian games.In chapter one, I analyse an unconventional contest inspired by the real world.In this contest, players are ranked by a scoring rule based on both their realised performance and how close this performance is to a target set before the contest,which is private information. I elucidate and analyse the incentive properties of these rules then characterise the equilibrium behaviour of the players.In chapter two, I integrate aspects from adverse selection and moral hazard models to provide a unied theory of securitisation under asymmetric information.I show that introducing skin in the game increases signalling costs for originators who performed sufficient due-diligence yet still improves incentives by making high effort relatively more likely. I relax the conventional assumption of risk neutrality and show that risk-sharing concerns are sufficient for the aforementioned qualitative properties of equilibrium to hold. Finally, I demonstrate that, depending on the severity of the originator's preference for liquidity or need to share risk, each setting may be more conducive for signalling.In chapter three, I propose a simple and intuitive way to transform canonical signalling games with exogenous types into games in which the informed agent endogenously generates her private information through an unobservable costly effort decision. I provide portable results on the differentiability of action functions and existence of equilibrium. I then apply these results to classic models of security design and the job market to demonstrate the practical usefulness of endogenous effort. In particular, my approach in these applications lends |
| Abstract |
theoretical support to stylised facts that cannot be derived from the standard signalling framewo |
| Publication date |
2019. |
| Name |
Dickson, Alex, degree supervisor. |
| Name |
De Feo, Giuseppe, degree supervisor. |
| Name |
University of Strathclyde. Department of Economics. |
| Thesis note |
Thesis Ph. D. University of Strathclyde 2019 T15382 |
| Note |
Error on Spine and title page. Date given is 2018. Date of award is 2019. |
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